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Abstract 
James Tartaglia in his book Philosophy in a Meaningless Life advances what he calls ‘The 
Transcendent Hypothesis’ as a solution to the problem of consciousness. The present paper examines 
T’s solution in light of his definition of ‘transcendence’, offers several criticisms of the solution, and 
briefly, indicates a conception of consciousness on which the problem does not arise. 
 
1.  
 
James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life is a book wide in scope 
and bristling with ideas. We shall mainly focus on just one, viz., his application 
of the concept of transcendence to the problem of consciousness. The problem, as 
he presents it, should be familiar to philosophers; his proposal for solving it, 
however, is novel (at least I have never encountered it before). 
The problem, very roughly, might be stated as follows: whereas the existence 
of consciousness (or experience) cannot be denied, it is not obvious what exactly 
consciousness is. 
Thus, as T explains, identifying it with something going on in the brain or 
anywhere else in the natural world (which T often refers to as ‘objective reality’) 
– a view to which many contemporary philosophers have subscribed – seems, at 
least in some respects, to clash with our everyday conception of consciousness, 
and in that sense to be what T calls a ‘revisionist’ view of the matter. Thus, e.g., 
things might be arranged so that you could catch a glimpse of what is going on in 
your brain right now. Does it seem right that the activity (in that pulpy, convoluted 
mass) of which you are, via a mirror, say, visually aware might be your 
consciousness? You can point to the activity. Can you point to your 
consciousness?   
But if it is not something going on in your brain, what else might your 
consciousness be? Traditionally, some philosophers have appealed to a view of 
reality as including not just what T calls objective reality (the natural world) but 
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a discrete, further reality, which is essentially spaceless and hence radically 
different from objective reality (the Cartesian soul). Yet this raises the awkward 
question of how, in that case, our consciousness might, as it certainly seems to, 
arise causally out of – and in turn may cause – events which belong to the 
physiological make-up of the human beings we are and thus are part of objective 
reality; not to speak of the fact that the idea of such a further reality seems foreign 
to any conception of reality which respects modern science. 
 
2. 
 
Such, then, is the problem of consciousness. We cannot deny the existence of 
consciousness or experience; yet there seems to be nothing which it might be. 
There have been, since Descartes, countless suggestions for solving the problem. 
T’s solution turns around the concept of transcendence. 
T’s solution, if I understand it correctly, is very simple. Consciousness, 
whatever exactly it is, is a kind of activity or state or event – that is, a kind of 
phenomenon – that occurs on the part of (let us suppose) a human subject. The 
problem, once again, is that consciousness cannot be identified with any 
phenomenon that is part either of objective reality or a supposed (spaceless) 
addendum to this reality; hence, while it is undeniable that there is such a thing as 
consciousness, there seems to be nothing that it might be. T’s solution (he calls it 
the ‘Transcendent Hypothesis’) is that, in trying to locate consciousness either, on 
the one hand, in objective reality or, on the other, in the Cartesian addendum to 
this, we overlook the further possibility that it might be part of what T describes 
as a ‘transcendent’ reality – which, he maintains, is where consciousness should 
be located (PML, p. 104). 
 
3. 
 
Of course, everything hangs on what is meant here by ‘transcendent reality’. 
What, e.g., is the difference between the reality that is objective and that which is 
transcendent? If we assume the former is that of which we are perceptually aware 
and which spreads out (endlessly) around us now in space and time, then what 
might the latter be? 
T distinguishes two senses of ‘transcendent’. On the first, one reality 
transcends another for the simple reason that it is a different reality (or perhaps 
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we should say, kind of reality) from the other. On this sense, however, the 
Cartesian addendum would ‘transcend’ the objective world. So far from solving 
the problem of consciousness, this is part of the picture which gives rise to the 
problem. 
On the second sense, the fact that one reality transcends another – this would 
be at least a necessary versus sufficient condition – entails that entities belonging 
to these realities, though spatio-temporal, have no spatial or temporal relation to 
each other. Thus, no matter how long and in what direction I travel away from the 
point I currently occupy, I could never get ‘closer to’ or ‘further from’ an entity 
that belongs to a transcendent reality (Valberg 2007).  
Now, although T does not explicitly characterize transcendence in this way, it 
seems to capture what he has in mind. Thus he says that the ‘only concrete model 
of transcendence we have ... [is one in which entities in the transcending reality] 
stand to the objective world as the objective world stands to [the world of] a 
dream’ (PML, p. 103). There are, in fact, aspects of T’s view of the dream/reality 
contrast to which I would take exception; but these do not affect our present 
discussion. Let us therefore agree to take this contrast as our model for 
understanding transcendence. 
According to T, the key to solving the problem of consciousness lies in what 
he calls the ‘Transcendent Hypothesis (TH)’. The TH says that, e.g., my present 
consciousness belongs neither to objective reality nor its Cartesian addendum, but 
to a transcendent reality: a reality that stands to the objective world (the reality I 
take to include both myself and the objects spreading out endlessly around me) in 
the way that, if this were a dream, the objects and phenomena belonging to the 
reality outside the dream would transcend the world that spreads out around me. 
The TH, if correct, seems to solve the problem of consciousness. But 
problems, or questions, arise. We shall mention three.  
     
4. 
 
If consciousness belongs neither to objective reality nor its Cartesian 
addendum, we are, as T maintains, required neither to accept the kind of 
revisionism that identifies consciousness with phenomena in the brain nor to 
grapple with the supposed conundrum of how consciousness and these 
phenomena might causally interact. Indeed, if consciousness belongs to a 
transcendent reality, there is – there can be – no question of any such identification 
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or interaction.  
But is it not a well-known fact, a commonplace, that what transpires in the 
brain affects how things are from within consciousness or experience – that, e.g., 
taking certain drugs (which act on the brain) may affect our perception of colour, 
that brain damage can radically alter the way objects appear?  
The point is not lost on T. But he thinks that such commonplace beliefs are 
the result of a mistake, viz., of our misinterpreting consciousness or experience, 
which is a transcendent reality, as ‘both part of the objective world and a 
subjective entity, in order to interpret it as indirect awareness of an objective world 
(PML, p. 112).’ I am not sure I understand this, or, indeed, why we should have 
the aim of interpreting consciousness as an indirect awareness etc. Or, if it is not 
meant to be an ‘aim’, why suppose that we place such a convoluted and (no doubt) 
misguided construction on things when all we seem to be doing is – in our habitual 
inductivist way – ascribing a causal connection on the basis of an observed 
succession of phenomena (e.g., taking drugs and an alteration in the way objects 
look to us)? Of course, such everyday inductive leaps may prove ill-founded; but 
it seems implausible to suppose they involve the kind of philosophical 
misinterpretation contemplated by T. 
     
5. 
 
Another difficulty is this. On T’s view, my present consciousness (call it ‘C’) 
belongs to a transcendent reality – but I misinterpret C (as being both part of 
objective reality and subjective.) The difficulty is that, in order for me to 
misinterpret C, that is, to take it to have properties it does (or could) not have, I 
would first have to single out C referentially. Yet if C belongs to a transcendent 
reality, this is not possible. The possibility of misinterpreting an entity E 
presupposes a kind of referential contact with E that is necessarily absent in the 
case where E is a transcendent entity. 
I can, unproblematically, refer to entities and phenomena in, say, my dream of 
last night. But then, although the world of which I am a part transcends the world 
of the dream, I have access in memory to the world of the dream. However, if this, 
right now, were a dream, I would not have access to the world that would 
presumably stand outside this. Do I have memories of it? Can I see or touch etc. 
entities in that transcendent reality? If this were a dream, the reality that 
transcends the dream would be, for me, nothing more than ‘something’ that exists 
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or is there – ‘something’ into which I might emerge.  
In that case, it is not clear how I might, in thought, single out for reference the 
entities – the objects and phenomena – that comprise the supposedly transcendent 
reality. On the dream hypothesis, there would be such a reality, but the entities by 
which it is comprised would be, for me, outside referential reach. They would not 
be entities about which I might form either a correct or an incorrect interpretation.  
     
6.  
 
The last problem we shall mention concerns the role of the dream hypothesis 
in T’s argument. I may toy with the dream hypothesis, but in fact I believe this is 
not a dream: the world around me is the real world, not a dream world. T, I take 
it, would assert the same with respect to his own case. However, his conception 
of a transcendent reality requires (I hope I have him right here) that this is a dream. 
Thus, as we noted earlier, he says our only model for understanding 
transcendence is one in which entities in the transcending reality stand to the 
objective world as the objective world stands to [the world of] a dream. So, if I 
am to take seriously the idea that my present consciousness belongs to a 
transcendent reality, I must assume that this is a dream. But, it seems, that is just 
what I cannot assume, since, once again, I believe this is reality. 
This has an awkward consequence. On T’s view, my consciousness is part of 
transcendent reality. If (as I believe) this is not a dream, there is no transcendent 
reality. And my consciousness? It seems that, on T’s view, not only that it is part 
neither of objective reality or its Cartesian addendum, but that there is no such 
thing as my consciousness.      
     
7.  
 
Yet I agree with T’s basic negative point that consciousness is part neither of 
(what he calls) objective reality or its Cartesian addendum. I also agree that it is 
therefore a mistake to conceive of consciousness as some kind of phenomenon 
(state or process or activity etc.) occurring in our heads or souls. The alternative, 
I suggest, involves not that consciousness is transcendent, but that it is, as I might 
put it, horizonal. 
The familiar debate in current philosophy about consciousness or experience 
assumes that it is something which occurs or goes on in us – that it is a 
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phenomenon – the main issue being whether it occurs in our brains (the more 
popular view) or in our souls (the view to be avoided). And there is no denying 
that we at least sometimes conceive of consciousness (experience) in this way. 
Thus, e.g., if you observe me looking at my hand, you might think that light rays 
reflected from my hand are striking my eyes and initiating a complex string of 
phenomena whose upshot is yet another phenomenon occurring in me, viz., my 
visual experience or consciousness of my hand. 
But suppose you adopt toward my consciousness the first-person perspective, 
and consider how things are for me in looking at my hand. I think: ‘Here is my 
hand, present within my consciousness (experience).’ In this case, it seems 
nonsense to regard the term ‘consciousness’ as referring to something that is going 
on in me, a phenomenon. (What would it be for my hand to be present in 
something going on in me?) Here, rather, ‘consciousness (experience)’ refers to 
that from within which my hand is present, not to a phenomenon but to a horizon.  
OK. I have developed this idea at length elsewhere. Suffice it to say, the two 
conceptions of consciousness – as a phenomenon and as a horizon – are radically 
different. As we said, it is the phenomenal conception that philosophers assume 
when they argue about whether consciousness can be identified with phenomena 
in the brain. In this debate, the horizonal conception of consciousness remains in 
the background. On the horizonal conception, consciousness (experience) is part 
neither of the brain or the soul; it is neither material nor ethereal. It is in a sense 
nothing, that is, nothing in itself: nothing apart from there being something given 
or present from within it.        
     
8.  
 
T, as we noted, claims that our conception of consciousness or experience in 
terms of states (and more generally, phenomena), is the result of a confusion. This 
seems to me right – although, as I said (Section 4), I do not understand T’s 
diagnosis of the confusion. 
As I see it, the confusion consists in running together our conception of 
consciousness as something which occurs in our heads, hence as a phenomenon 
of some kind, with that of the horizon from within which the world is present to 
us. On the horizonal conception, consciousness, so far from being a phenomenon, 
is in a real sense nothing: it is nothing apart from something being given from 
within it; nothing, that is, in itself. The confused amalgamation of these two ideas 
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issues in the problematic conception of something which is both a phenomenon 
and yet somehow less than that – a shadowy or ethereal phenomenon. 
There are, indeed, relevant phenomena on our part, viz., the events and 
processes, and so on, which occur in our brains and nervous systems. 
Consciousness does not consist of, but is caused by, such phenomena. Then what 
is consciousness – a further, shadowy phenomenon? Have we not omitted 
consciousness from our picture? 
What has been omitted is not a phenomenon but a fact. When, say, I look at 
my hand, various things happen in the world, including the part of the world (the 
human being) that I am: light waves reflect from my hand to my eyes, the optic 
nerve is stimulated, impulses are transmitted to my brain, and so on. The upshot 
is not a further perhaps shadowy phenomenon but a fact, viz., the fact that my 
hand is there, visually present from within my consciousness. 
Consciousness figures here not as something that occurs inside my head, 
hence as a phenomenon, but as the horizon within which the fact of presence 
holds. Suppose the fact in question were the fact, say, that a flash of lightning is 
present to me. The flash would be a phenomenon. However, the consciousness 
from within which the fact of the flash’s presence holds would not be another 
phenomenon. Would there be two phenomena – one outside my head (the flash) 
and the other inside my head (my consciousness of the flash)? There would be 
just one, the flash, the fact of whose presence holds from within the horizon of 
my consciousness.  
     
9.  
 
Of course, as we said, there are things going on inside my head, viz., the events 
(phenomena) in my brain which are – or so we may suppose – responsible not just 
for whatever facts of presence hold from within my consciousness but for the fact 
that there is such a thing as my consciousness from within such facts hold. Thus 
each of us knows that when this activity ceases (which one day it will), then that 
will be it: there will be just nothing.     
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